Trade Secret Theft

When employees leave a company, it is common that departing staff may take electronic files belonging to their former employer. Matthew Prewitt, a trade secret litigator shares his experiences pursuing and defending against such litigation. The role of computer forensics and the importance it plays in getting to the truth is discussed in this informative interview.

Leading computer forensics Expert Lee Neubecker discusses trade secret misappropriation by a departing employee and how that can lead to a competitor gaining an unfair competitive edge. The Chair of Schiff Hardin’s trade secret practice, Matthew Prewitt, emphasizes the importance of working with a computer forensics expert to preserve digital evidence and perform effective discovery that can later be used if litigation is necessary. Enigma Forensics staff are experts when investigating a departed employee using computer forensics.

The transcript of the video follows:

Lee Neubecker: Hi, I’m here today with Matt Prewitt. Matt is the chair of Schiff Hardin’s trade secret practice, and is an experienced litigator that focuses on the area of trade secret theft. Matt, thanks for being on the show.

Matthew Prewitt: Thanks for having me, Lee.

Lee Neubecker: We’ve had cases we worked on before involving departed employees. Could you tell everyone a little bit about your experience in this area, dealing with trade secret theft?

Matthew Prewitt: Sure, I mean as a trial lawyer, I’ve litigated both sides, sometimes, defending the departing employee, and/or that employee’s new employer, other times representing as the plaintiff, the company that the employee left.

Lee Neubecker: So, can you tell people generally what happens when you’re on the side of that had the employee that left? What happens at ground zero?

Matthew Prewitt: Well, ideally, the company would already have in place a structure of trade secret protection, and contractual, policy, and technology protections against unfair competition by the departing employee. So, that framework consists of, typically, a confidentiality agreement with the employee, perhaps a set of restrictive covenants, like a non-compete agreement, and then, hopefully, handbook policies that govern the conduct of the employee. Those will be coupled with restrictions, of course, that integrate with the company’s relationships, with its vendors and customers. Basically what the company ideally should be doing, is sitting down with outside counsel, in-house counsel, IT, and thinking about all the places where the company has sensitive, competitive information, trade secrets, or other confidential information, that are at risk when an employee turns out to be disloyal.

Lee Neubecker: So, when a client calls you, and they suspect that someone took stuff, what do you advise them to do, initially?

Matthew Prewitt: Well, I mean the first is to assess the situation and, that consists of identifying, with these days, almost everything is electronic of course, so, the first part of the assessment is to identify the types of electronic information that the departing employee would have access to. Either legitimately, during the course of that employee’s work, or, by exceeding the policy limits or protections that the company had in place. You’re doing, you’re identifying those areas for two reasons, one, preservation of evidence is very very important. And there’s no way to know what you need to preserve if you don’t know what the employee had access to, or potentially could’ve stolen. And then the other reason is to assess the competitive risk, and to begin to develop a plan for the investigation, and perhaps litigation response if it turns out to be warranted.

Lee Neubecker: And, so, typically, I know part of that initial response, when I’ve worked with you in the past, you want a forensic image made of the employee’s computer, before anyone mucks it up.

Matthew Prewitt: That is a, certainly an important starting point. With the changes in technology, for better or for worse, the places where the relevant data reside and the places that need to be preserved are, are multiplying instead of getting narrower, so, the hard drive of the laptop remains a very important source, because, forensically, it is often times the area that is most susceptible to forensic analysis and investigation. But there certainly are other places, as well. Cloud storage, the company’s computer network, personal email account of the employee, personal phone, company-issued phone, it goes on.

Lee Neubecker: I know when I first started in this area many years ago, the misappropriation was on a CD-ROM, and now, you’ve got smart phones, you’ve got USB drives, but the cloud is a whole other area of concern, because, companies can connect to Dropbox, Box.com, various other place, AWS, and move data to the cloud, so that, that becomes another point of concern in a need to be able to collect and preserve data from sources other than the computer.

Matthew Prewitt: You’re absolutely right, Lee.

Lee Neubecker: So can you tell us any war stories about what, what’s happened in the past when you’ve used forensics to pursue a case, and what kind of result you’ve been able to get for your clients?

Matthew Prewitt: Sure. I mean the forensic examination is really a critical part of a trade secrets case, especially if you’re on the plaintiff side, because, in, when you’re in court, trying to enforce restrictions against a departing employee, the, for better or for worse, the court is typically going to start that process with having, with some sympathy to the departing employee. I mean we are in America, and people are supposed to be rewarded for their ingenuity and hard work, and, employee mobility from one company to another is a basic value of our society. So, showing the court that the employee cannot be trusted to do the right thing, to be an honest and ethical employee at the new employer, at the new, at the competitor that she or he’s goin’ to, is really really important for building an effective non-compete case, or trade secrets theft case as a plaintiff.

Lee Neubecker: So for instance, if your client had a policy of no USB drives, and didn’t use USB drives, but yet, your forensic expert reported that a USB device was plugged into the computer the day before they filed their resignation, and that various files appear to have been copied to that drive, that would be something that would be compelling in support of an injunction, correct?

Matthew Prewitt: It’s certainly a brick in the building that you’re trying, or the story that you’re trying to build from court, absolutely.

Lee Neubecker: So there’s other pieces too, have you had situations where you’ve petitioned the court to allow discovery of that departed employee’s home computer, or the new workplace computer?

Matthew Prewitt: Yes, part of the forensic exercise is demonstrating the need for that discovery. And so, what you’ll want to start with as part of your initial investigation, is to have your forensic expert look for evidence that will show that the employee has used her home computer, has used external devices, has copied to the cloud, and once you can show the migration of data, under suspicious circumstances, off the realm of the company-owned hardware or accounts, then that’s the central starting point for demonstrating the court that you need a more invasive approach into the personal devices and accounts of the departing employee.

Lee Neubecker: Great so, let’s say that the plaintiff attorney has established convincingly with their forensic expert that data was misappropriated, and that the data clearly is confidential, and trade secret-type information. If you’re advising the new company that hired the sales person, and you saw the report and you believed the report to be credible, how might you try to help that new employer end the litigation and get things to a peaceful place?

Matthew Prewitt: Hopefully that they, the new employer has already laid the foundation for that scenario by instructing the employee before arriving, that they should not copy or take things with them, from their previous employment, should not load things onto the company network that are… belong to the previous employer, et cetera. And, to have done that in writing. If that’s happened, that puts the new employer in a potentially awkward spot, because you have an employee who not only has, has taken his former, his or her former employer’s stuff, but then has also disregarded the instructions of the new employer as well. That’s the situation where the new employer may be seriously considering terminating its relationship with the new employee.

Lee Neubecker: I’ve seen that happen, I’ve also seen situations where, the employee who departs agrees to have forensic inspections on his computer, and, signs an agreement that pretty much guarantees that if he’s caught doing something with this, that he’s going to have, face massive legal costs, and admit to wrongdoing.

Matthew Prewitt: That’s where that trust factor or credibility factor, that comes, that’s one example of where it becomes really critical. Not only is the court typically going to be inclined to the defendant departing employee’s situation, and want that employee to be able have gainful employment, many courts are also going to want to give that employee a second chance. And the second chance here is the chance to turn over the, turn over the information, and provide exactly the kind of affidavit or certification you’re referring to.

Lee Neubecker: Great well, I appreciate you being on the show and talking about this topic. It’s one that impacts most businesses, so, thanks again for being on the show.

Keys to Investigating Departed Employees using Computer Forensics

  • Forensically preserve the departed employee’s computer storage media before any examination of the contents occurs
  • Look for recently accessed files as reported by shortcuts and other system activity logs
  • Analyze recently deleted files to look for evidence of trade secret theft
  • Investigate recent connections of external storage to the computer
  • Build a timeline of events that led up to the departure to assist in an efficient investigation
  • Hire an experienced computer forensics expert – that’s us

Read More on Trade Secret Theft:

Computer Fraud & Abuse Act Charges Filed

Capital One Data Breach

Capital One Data Breach – Interview of Data Privacy & eDiscovery expert on the fallout

Cyber Security &  Computer Forensics Expert Lee Neubecker interviews Data Privacy Expert Debbie Reynolds on the fallout from the recently disclosed Capital One Data Breach that occurred following alleged hacking of the company’s data stored in the cloud.  Issues discussed include an assessment of how the CEO of Capital One managed the crisis, pending charges filed against Paige Thompson and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the government’s complaint filed earlier this week.

Transcript of video follows

Lee Neubecker: Hi, I’m here today with Debbie Reynolds from Debbie Reynolds Consulting and we’re going to be talking today about the recent news involving the Capital One Data Breach Thank you for being on the show Debbie.

Debbie Reynolds: Thank you for inviting me. It’s such a thrill, you’re such a joy to be around to talk to so it’s great to do this

Lee Neubecker: Well it’s great to have you here. So, trial’s expected this Thursday in the case. Can you tell everyone a little bit about what happened this week?

Debbie Reynolds: So this week is in the news that Capital One had a data breach. There was a woman who used to be, I believe she’s worked Amazon if I’m not mistaken, who had found a vulnerability in Capital One’s cloud system, and was able to obtain private or digital information on over a hundred billion customers or potential customers for Capital One so as far as I can tell they say that she may have gathered social security numbers and other private information about individuals who had even applied, who may not even be customers of Capital One, who have even applied for a Capital One credit card back as far as 2005.

Lee Neubecker: Yep.

Debbie Reynolds: So the vulnerability that was discovered and part of the reason why it was discovered was because she had apparently bragged about it on Twitter and she used her real name and so they were able to pull this stuff together. And I think the SWAT team went to her house?

Lee Neubecker: Yeah, so she was using the IP, iPredator, which is supposed to anonymize and protect you. When she was using that she created her online GitHub accounts and other accounts and it had that IP, the iPredator IP address range in her profile linked to her name. So she wasn’t really being smart about it.

Debbie Reynolds: No. So yeah, I think that she was bragging about what she had, I guess she was proud of what she had done and apparently someone who had seen something she had post on some forum contacted Capital One. This wasn’t a breach in which Capital One found out about; someone from the outside said, “Hey, this girl says that she has your data” and now it’s a really big thing.

Lee Neubecker: Yeah so now she’s charged with a computer fraud and abuse act which I think she’ll probably end up …

Debbie Reynolds: Yeah.

Lee Neubecker: Do you think she’ll get a plea?

Debbie Reynolds: She’s probably going to go to the slammer. It seems like especially when the SWAT team showed up at her house, they’re definitely going to make an example out of her with this. It’s pretty bad because I think right now the reports and what’s coming out from Capital One are different than what she said or what other people said they have. Because at one point they were saying that Capital One in their statement said that certain people’s social security numbers weren’t breached but then we know that they did get people’s social security numbers.

Lee Neubecker: It was mostly Canadian social security numbers, around a million–

Debbie Reynolds: Right.

Lee Neubecker: And then I think it was somewhere around 100,000 or so U.S. citizens.

Debbie Reynolds: Right, exactly.

Lee Neubecker: So it doesn’t necessarily impact the entirety of U.S. customers, but it still is–

Debbie Reynolds: It doesn’t, it doesn’t make you feel good. Yeah so basically over a hundred million people were touched in some way, shape or form. Even though not everyone’s personal data was taken to the same extent as everyone else, but I think this incident illustrates for us a couple of different things. First of all, they were saying that they had credit card information or information on people who had applied for credit cards going back as far as 2005. I’m not sure if they can make a justification for why they even had some of that stuff.

Debbie Reynolds: It’s first place. Especially if and I wonder what rights someone would have if they weren’t actually didn’t translate to being a customer of Capital One. The law’s kind of murky about how they should do that. I guess that’s the same issue with Equifax where not everyone who was touched by Equifax are customers of Equifax, they just happened to have their data.

Lee Neubecker: What would, how would you have advised Capital One had you gotten in there before the data breach?

Lee Neubecker: You think you might have been able to–

Debbie Reynolds: Well, you know–

Lee Neubecker: Get them in a better situation?

Debbie Reynolds: I think a lot of corporations, my view is that a lot of corporations have this mindset or business has this mindset of does it work? Does the computer work? Can I do the thing I need to do on a computer? The question that they’re not asking is is it secure? So a lot of them have a blind spot in terms of securing things because as long as it doesn’t impact their ability to work, they don’t really care how it works. So now companies have to ask how does it work? Is it secure? A lot of companies have these issues where they’re moving from internal infrastructure to the cloud and we know that the cloud infrastructure would typically be more secure quote unquote than someone’s on premise infrastructure but that all depends on how it was configured. The vulnerability that this woman was able to exploit in Capital One had to do with how the permissions and things were configured on a cloud infrastructure.

Lee Neubecker: And she had worked in that environment.

Debbie Reynolds: Right. So she had a little bit of extra insight–

Debbie Reynolds: Exactly.

Lee Neubecker: In this process.

Debbie Reynolds: Exactly. But I don’t know if you probably run into the same thing where you’re having clients that have cloud issues and they may feel more secure in themselves. Okay, we think our native is more safe than the cloud, not to say that the cloud is not safe, but if we have someone who doesn’t know how to fill those gaps and stop those vulnerabilities, it could be a huge problem.

Lee Neubecker: What do you think of the CEO’s response from Capital One?

Debbie Reynolds: I saw CEO’s response. I don’t know, someone needs to do a series about this where you compare all the response letters from these data breaches or whatever.

Lee Neubecker: That’s a great idea.

Debbie Reynolds: Not a bad response at all. I think the danger though is there may be an issue with consumer confidence obviously because no one wants their data breached, but if the things that are being said by the CEO or other leadership it becomes evident that it’s different than what actually happened, that’s going to be a problem.

Lee Neubecker: Yeah, cool.

Debbie Reynolds: I think rushing, the desire is to rush. To put out as much information as you possibly can but already the news reports are contradicting what the company is saying about what was actually breached.

Lee Neubecker: Well the complaint is available, I’ll post that on my website as well. I read the complaint and there’s a lot of detail in there and you’re right, in the news story they’re talking about Amazon cloud, they talk about a company that presumably is a subsidiary of Amazon inside the complaint.

Debbie Reynolds: Right.

Lee Neubecker: But they didn’t specifically mention Amazon in the complaint.

Debbie Reynolds: No, no so it’s going to be customers when they feel like they’ve had a data breach they definitely want, you know there’s attention that has to happen where the company wants to be as forthright and forthcoming as possible about what’s happened, but the facts may still be rolling out.

Lee Neubecker: Yeah.

Debbie Reynolds: The drip, drip, drip of it all may be tough I think.

Lee Neubecker: But I thought at least it was good that they public acknowledged it. It didn’t take forever to acknowledge it.

Debbie Reynolds: Oh, right exactly.

Lee Neubecker: And apologize, I mean–

Debbie Reynolds: Oh, absolutely. It does goes a long way–

Lee Neubecker: They just did that so I applaud them for not–

Debbie Reynolds: Absolutely.

Lee Neubecker: Sitting on it like Equifax.

Debbie Reynolds: Right. They didn’t say, “Well I’m sorry that you were hurt or you felt hurt,” or something where it’s like oh yeah, you know there is harm there so you might as well acknowledge it and try to at least be forthright about what you know and we know it.

Lee Neubecker: And from what I read too, not all of the data, some of the data was tokenized but there were birth dates, there were some socials. Debbie Reynolds: Right.

Lee Neubecker: And some other information that certainly if that were you or me, well we’re kind of becoming used to this all the time. It’s sad, but.

Debbie Reynolds: Right, well I mean and what we’re seeing, what I’m seeing, what companies are trying to argue in the U.S. having to do with data privacy is if you put, let’s say you’re on Facebook and you say, “Hey, today’s my birthday!” You know so if Lee puts his birthday on Facebook, is Lee’s birthday private? So let’s say you’re a Capital One customer, they could argue you know your birthday is not private because you put it on Facebook. That’s going to be an interesting theme.

Lee Neubecker: Well thanks so much for being on the show today.

Debbie Reynolds: It was fantastic, thank you.

Debbie Reynolds Contact Info

datadiva at debbiereynoldsconsulting dot com
312-513-3665
https://www.linkedin.com/in/debbieareynolds/
https://debbiereynoldsconsulting.com/